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Throughout its history, Canada has often become a place of  refuge for people
who suffered oppression in their countries of  origin. In the 1970s, one such
group consisted of  Chileans who fled their homeland after the coup d’état that
toppled the government of  President Salvador Allende on 11 September 1973.
With the overthrow of  Chile’s experiment in democratic socialism and the state
repression that followed, hundreds of  thousands of  people from all walks of  life
left the country, resulting in la diáspora chilena, the Chilean diaspora.1 Often they
left under duress or out of  fear for their lives and those of  their families. In
many cases, the persecuted had no plan to escape to a particular country of
refuge; they took shelter wherever they could. In this context, by October 1973
Canada became a place of  refuge for Chileans forced from their homes. While
Canada did not shelter as many as some other nations, it nonetheless has played
a significant role in the Chilean diaspora.2
As this study will argue, the presence of  Chilean exiles in Canada is the
result of  the concerted pressure on the federal government by leftist or left-lean-
ing parties and organisations, in the face of  denial in Ottawa of  the severity of
the humanitarian crisis in Chile. The coalition working in solidarity with perse-
cuted Chileans included the New Democratic Party (NDP), the Parti Québécois
(PQ), and smaller parties, such as the Communist Party of  Canada; organised
labour, through the Canadian Labour Congress and the Confédération des syndicats
nationaux; non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and
Oxfam; concerned academics, under the banner of  the Canadian Association of
University Teachers (CAUT) and the World University Service (WUS); citizens’
groups, such as the Toronto Welcome Committee for Chilean Refugees and the
Comité d'accueil pour les Réfugiés Chiliens in Quebec; and, perhaps most importantly
for the Chilean question, progressive elements within various Christian denomi-
nations, many under the umbrella of  the Canadian Council of  Churches (CCC).3
This agglomeration of  disparate but like-minded bodies lobbied the federal gov-
ernment to allow Chileans in under relaxed immigration criteria and assist in
their passage, citing the precedent of  special admissions programmes for
Hungarians (1956-7), Czechoslovakians (1968), Tibetans (1971), and Ugandans
of  Asian descent (1972). 
In the fall of  1973, the attitude and actions of  representatives of  the
Canadian government came under heavy criticism for a perceived unwillingness
to cooperate fully in resettling Chileans whose lives were in danger. During the
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Cold War, admitting people associated with the political left was problematic for
reasons connected to internal security and reflected an ideological bias against
supposed members of  the enemy camp. Officials working for the ministries of
Manpower and Immigration (the forerunner of  today’s Department of
Citizenship and Immigration) and External Affairs initially reacted to the coup
d’état and subsequent humanitarian crisis with a mixture of  distaste for the vic-
tims and ignorance of  their plight. I will discuss the obstacles to accepting
Chileans and how these barriers were overcome through the solidarity activities
of  progressives within Canada. I will also show how the success of  the Chilean
refugee lobby at influencing changes in policy and practice had longer-term out-
comes for human rights issues and solidarity movements throughout the 1970s
and into the following decade.
My research on this topic draws largely on internal government docu-
ments, including diplomatic telegrams between Ottawa, Santiago and other con-
sulates in Latin America in the fall of  1973 that illustrate anti-leftist bias and the
reluctance of  the federal government to act decisively to assist the persecuted in
Chile. Criticism of  government (in)action formed an integral part of  the solidari-
ty network’s public campaign for the acceptance of  refugees from Chile, and is a
continuing motif  in the newsletters, reports and press releases from the time.
These primary sources constitute the backbone of  this study, along with
Hansard records from the House of  Commons that show the debates over the
Chilean issue at the highest level of  government.
Recent scholarship on the Chilean experience in Canada, such as José
Del Pozo’s Les Chiliens au Québec: Immigrants et réfugiés, de 1955 à nos jours or Julie
Shayne’s They Used to Call Us Witches: Chilean Exiles, Culture, and Feminism largely
focus on the points of  view, lived experiences, and community activities of  exiles
and immigrants. Studies such as these provide invaluable insight into the memo-
ries and opinions of  the people who resettled in Canada, and the challenges they
faced.4 In my own doctoral research on this topic, I also devoted attention pri-
marily to the testimony of  twenty-one Chilean exiles about how and why they
came to Canada, and what kind of  lives they had in a new country that was in
many ways for them a kind of  “golden cage.”5 Immigration historians in recent
years have increasingly concentrated on the people involved rather than the pro-
cesses and institutions, in part as a reaction to the tendency identified by Harold
Troper in 1988 of  Canadian historical writing to be “largely preoccupied with
the interests of  the gatekeepers, ignoring those who pass through the gates.”6
However, this particular examination features a strong “top-down”ele-
ment insofar as it looks at government policy and the decisions and thought pro-
cesses of  elite actors, such as ambassadors and government ministers. This focus
is essential when we consider the Cold War context in which the Chilean crisis
played out. As Franca Iacovetta illustrated in Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives
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in Cold War Canada, Cold War anxieties had a deep impact on Canadian immigra-
tion policy, reception and citizenship programmes, and in government circles
created a conservative consensus about the need to battle communist influence
both at home and abroad.7 While the successes of  the solidarity lobby described
in this article highlight the limits of  government power in the face of  sustained
public pressure, we cannot ignore the fundamental role of  institutions and poli-
cies in the acceptance and rejection of  Chileans seeking shelter in Canada.
The emergence of  a solidarity lobby around the Chilean crisis resulted
from changes in social and political beliefs and movements at both the interna-
tional and domestic level. To begin, let us look first at the Unidad Popular admin-
istration that governed Chile from 1970 to 1973 and its international appeal to
understand why a coup in a distant and largely unknown country provoked such
a rapid and passionate response among progressive groups across Canada.
The “Chilean Road to Socialism”
Riding on Chile’s narrow shoulders was nothing less than a world his-
torical test of  whether the transition to socialism could be achieved
through democratic, peaceful methods. If  it could be done in Chile,
then it could be done in Italy or France or…8
Salvador Allende was elected president of  Chile in September 1970 as
the head of  a coalition of  a half-dozen left and centre-left parties known as the
Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, henceforth UP). The UP, with the Communist
Party and Socialist Party at its core, vowed to use state institutions and legislation
to create a socialist system gradually. Allende himself  promised “the first socialist
society built according to the principles of  democracy, plurality and liberty.”9
The transformation to socialism, the UP leadership claimed, would be in the best
interest of  the nation: it would make Chilean society more egalitarian and end
dependence on foreign interests by using the country’s natural wealth for the
good of  all citizens.10 This strategy, the “Chilean road to socialism,” was
unorthodox and unique, and captured the imagination not just of  Chileans, but
of  people around the world. 
In Canada, religious bodies such as the Ecumenical Forum and organi-
sations interested in political and social issues, like the Latin American Working
Group (LAWG) in Toronto, looked at what was happening in Chile as the birth
of  “an egalitarian, humanistic society without the violent methods used else-
where.”11 The interest in the UP project from groups in Canada reflected an
increasing engagement in Latin America at state and popular levels. On one
hand, throughout the 1960s the nation attempted to redefine its place in the
world order and the international market as being distinct from the United
States, which resulted in more focus on Latin America as a potential source of
allies and trading partners and culminated in a new foreign policy focus on the
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region starting in 1968.12 At the non-state level, Canadians who sympathized
with countries who were attempting to decolonize or assert their economic and
political sovereignty looked to Latin American states such as Cuba as leaders of
the Third World movement, but were also engaged by negative events such as
the American invasion of  the Dominican Republic in 1965.13
For New Leftists who sought a different option than American-style
capitalism, with its acceptance of  inequality, or Soviet-style communism, with its
rigid system of  control and lack of  freedoms, the UP project represented a third
way, combining participatory democracy with social justice.14 Furthermore, the
peacefulness of  its methods and its efforts to alleviate poverty and other social
ills made the UP attractive to Christians of  all denominations, especially given
the influence of  liberation theology on small but vocal groups within the
churches who manifested a “sense of  Christian activism that coincided with
Canadians’ growing acceptance of  pluralism and more liberal social norms.”15
Like other socialists and social democrats around the world, leftist groups and
individuals in Canada watched the developments in Chile after 1970 with great
interest and hope, but also with a sense of  trepidation; given the geopolitical
reality of  the time, how far would the UP project be able to go? Could a moder-
ate approach to instituting far-reaching political, economic and social change
work in a time of  ideological polarisation and superpower intervention?
It could not. Despite notable achievements in the first two years of  its
mandate, by October 1972 the UP government faced chronic internal crises and
external manipulation that made the prospects for its survival increasingly unlike-
ly.16 Congress faced legislative deadlock, and capital flight and a campaign of
economic non-cooperation and obstruction led by the Chilean business elite cre-
ated a sense of  instability. Chile also experienced increasing polarisation on the
social level, as the country split between supporters of  the UP and the govern-
ment’s opponents, creating a divide that sowed animosity and eventually led to
violent street clashes between militants from the right and left.17
External pressure led by the Nixon administration in the United States
contributed to the state of  unrest. The US government had opposed the UP
from the first, and when covert attempts to keep Allende from power failed, the
Americans and their Chilean allies settled on a different approach: to sabotage
the country’s economy by withholding credit, foreign investment and vital indus-
trial materials, or in the words of  Richard Nixon, to “squeeze [Chile] until it
screamed.”18 Economic instability deepened and accentuated social division and
disorder, creating conditions that would work against the establishment of  “a
second communist state in the Western Hemisphere,” something the US govern-
ment viscerally feared since the success of  the Cuban Revolution barely a decade
earlier.19
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This combination of  internal division and external interference created
the desired effect. By 1973, Chile was destabilized and the UP government was
on precarious ground. The anti-UP leaders hoped for an electoral solution to the
situation, but this proved fruitless when the UP garnered 43% of  the vote in
Congressional elections in March 1973. Denied the two-thirds majority it needed
to impeach the president and end the UP project by legal means, an increasing
number of  Chileans contemplated extra-constitutional methods to restore order
through military intervention.20
The Chilean Armed Forces had not directly involved itself  in political
affairs since the 1930s and was seen both by Chileans and outsiders as profes-
sional and neutral.21 Respect for the institution was widespread, and Allende had
brought high-ranking military men into his cabinet in November 1972 as one of
the conditions for ending a truckers’ strike. However, there is evidence that by
that point, systematic plans to take over the government were already being
developed by middle-ranking officers in all three branches of  the military.22 The
political deadlock confirmed by the March election brought more officers
onside, and by September 1973 the military leadership was putting the final
touches on the takeover plan. Known leftist strongholds were searched for
weapons, the military garrisons throughout the country were put on alert on 1
September, and on 10 September around 50 pro-Allende officers in the army,
navy and air force were arrested as a pre-emptive measure.23 The next morning,
troops surrounded la Moneda, the presidential palace in downtown Santiago, and
ordered Allende to surrender. He refused. Late in the morning the air force
bombed the palace. At around 2:30 in the afternoon, after making a final radio
address to the nation, Allende is believed to have committed suicide. The minis-
ters of  the government were hunted down and rounded up, as were UP politi-
cians and party activists. Armed resistance to the coup was limited and ineffectu-
al. By the end of  11 September, the nation was under complete military control.
The Unidad Popular attempt at leading the country down the “Chilean road to
socialism” was finished.
Repression and reluctant refuge: the Canadian ambassador and the “riff-
raff  of  the Latin American left”
Even those who welcomed military intervention thought that it would be quick
and relatively painless, and that the Armed Forces would return power to the
civilian leadership as soon as order was restored. As it turned out, they were
entirely wrong. Vowing to “extirpate the Marxist cancer” represented by the UP,
the Armed Forces rounded up the movement’s leaders and tens of  thousands of
supporters from all parts of  society.24 Throughout the country, those connected
to the UP were interned in makeshift concentration camps, with many tortured
and hundreds summarily executed without due process.25 While the number
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killed in the initial crackdown is a matter of  debate, it was at least two thousand,
along with up to 80,000 people detained for at least 24 hours between
September 1973 and January 1974.26 The ferocity of  the repression and breadth
of  its reach made many UP supporters fear for their lives and leaving the coun-
try their only viable option. Embassies in Santiago soon faced a crush of  terri-
fied people seeking asylum from a military regime that viewed them as “anti-
patriotic agents of  foreign powers” –puppets of  Cuba and the Soviet Union
who had wanted to destroy Chile’s liberal democratic institutions and make the
country a totalitarian state.27
The embassies of  Latin American countries, among which Mexico and
Argentina played particularly prominent roles, became important havens from
persecution, along with the legations of  France, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy and
Great Britain. Canada initially became involved in the Chileans crisis due to the
presence of  three adults and one child seeking asylum.28 Over the next two
weeks, these four would be joined by thirteen others who were eventually given
refuge at the ambassador’s residence. Consular officials gave them shelter on the
grounds that they were fleeing from insurgents attacking a government recog-
nized by Canada. However, the acceptance of  these fugitives set a precedent of
assistance that some government officials found troubling. 
One major influence on Canadian consular officials was the attitude of
the ambassador himself. As was later leaked to the public, Ambassador Andrew
Ross, who was in Buenos Aires at the time of  the coup, quickly advised the gov-
ernment to recognize the junta:
O]n [the] present reading and at this distance I can see no useful pur-
pose in withholding recognition unduly. Indeed such action might even
tend to delay Chile’s eventual return to [the] democratic process. From
my knowledge of  [the] views of  senior military officers unlike Brazilian
or Peruvian models they would intend to turn [the] government back to
[the] civil authority with [the] minimum delay feasible.29 
Andrew Ross was later cast as a villain by people in Canada closely
involved in the Chilean issue, and statements he made certainly did not paint him
as sympathetic to the plight of  those in danger or fully aware of  the seriousness
of  the situation. His characterization of  the Allende administration as “surely
one of  the most incompetent of  recent times” echoed the accusations of  the
anti-UP Chilean media, as did his assessment regarding the military “[that] only
with [the] greatest reluctance did they decide that [the] institutional disintegration
and political madness of  recent months had to be arrested by shock treat-
ment.”30As the junta consolidated control and began a defamation campaign
against the overthrown government, Ross seems to have uncritically accepted
reports of  leftist guerrilla armies and the rampant misuse of  state funds by UP
politicians as true. However, his most infamous statement concerned foreigners
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in Chile in imminent danger due to the coup, and as we shall see later, it came
back to haunt him:
With almost [the] entire leadership dead or in custody Chile’s Marxist
left is decapitated and on [the] run.[The] country’s non political activity
is returning to normal progressively and quite rapidly but curfew is still
imposed [from] 3 pm to 7 am. Reprisals and searches have created [a]
panic atmosphere affecting particularly expatriates including [the] riff-
raff  of  [the] Latin American left to whom Allende gave asylum. These
“activists” are running out of  countries willing to accept them.31
If  the embassies of  the world represented the first sources of  solidarity
for the fugitives of  the coup d’état, the attitude of  the senior official on the
ground gave little hope that Canada would play a constructive role in the Chilean
crisis. However, while Ross was calling for recognition of  the junta, in Canada
progressive secular and religious groups began mobilizing to contest the ambas-
sador’s interpretation of  events, and to pressure a reluctant federal government
to assist the victims of  the military regime.
The solidarity movement takes action
To claim that the solidarity with Chile coalition appeared solely as a reaction to
the coup d’état would be misleading. Leftist organisations and other progressive
entities had observed the Chilean situation with keen interest after the election of
the UP, first with hope and then with dismay as the situation deteriorated. This
study looks mainly at solidarity activities that took place in Ottawa and Toronto;
however, the Chilean crisis provoked action and reaction from concerned indi-
viduals and entities across the country which worked under different names but
shared the common goals of  denouncing the coup d’état and assisting people in
jeopardy because of  it.
Even before the coup, the Latin American Working Group established
a special Chile Project committee, anticipating a bad end to the crisis.32 On 12
September, this group met in Toronto with other sympathetic organisations,
such as representatives of  the Canadian Council of  Churches (CCC), to form an
Ad Hoc Committee on Chile, which would later operate under the name Chile-
Canada Solidarity. The Committee set as its immediate goals lobbying the federal
government to withhold recognition of  the junta and to admit refugees.33
Meanwhile, members of  the Canadian Peace Congress, a group with ties to the
Communist Party of  Canada, held a demonstration at Toronto’s City Hall to
denounce the coup and appeal to the Canadian government to repudiate the
actions of  the Chilean Armed Forces.34 The following day in the House of
Commons, NDP member John Rodriguez brought the Ad Hoc Committee’s
positions into the political arena by introducing a motion that the government of
Canada refuse to recognize the junta and withdraw financial support for the
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Chilean government.35 Though the motion failed, it served to bring the Chilean
question to the fore and show that the NDP would be the parliamentary stan-
dard bearer for this cause. In Quebec, meanwhile, union leaders voiced their
concerns for the safety of  Chilean workers targeted by military repression and
called on the federal government to offer asylum, thus making clear that organ-
ised labour would also play the role of  advocate.36
On 14 September, leaders of  the Anglican, Roman Catholic and United
Churches addressed a telegram to Mitchell Sharp, the Minister of  External
Affairs, which introduced one of  the arguments why Canada should assist
Chileans affected by the coup, that of  the illegality of  the junta’s actions:
One thing is clear, that a democratically-elected government has been violently
overthrown…We caution against precipitous recognition of  an unconstitutional
regime. We request the Canadian government to do its utmost to so that consti-
tutional government be restored as soon as possible…We urge the Canadian
government to offer safe conduct and assistance to…refugees, and any Chileans
who may wish to come to Canada.37
This communication was followed within days by a call from the
Canadian Labour Congress which echoed the plea to withhold recognition of
the military government and launch “a vast humanitarian effort to save the lives
of  thousands of  political refugees.”38 On 17 September, the CCC continued the
campaign to pressure the government to act. In a press release, the organisation
began using an argument that would become a constant refrain in the Chilean
solidarity campaign:
Since these refugees are in danger of  their lives, under a very repressive
military regime, we have only one option: to do what we can to save
these lives. Canada opened her doors to refugees from Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Uganda. If  we refuse to open our doors to people
who are in danger under another type of  political regime, this would
mean that we had acted from political rather than humanitarian
motives.39
The appeal to past practice with regard to Iron Curtain and
Commonwealth refugees would serve as a weapon in the solidarity movement’s
arsenal when trying to convince the government and members of  the public to
do more to help displaced Chileans. In effect, it was a strategy to defuse Cold
War-era fears of  leftist infiltration by framing the Chilean situation as a humani-
tarian crisis that went beyond ideology. 
Soon after, Chileans themselves became involved in the solidarity
effort. On 20 September, a group of  Chilean students studying in Canadian uni-
versities demonstrated in Ottawa to petition the federal government to grant asy-
lum to political refugees, but were given a cool reception by unidentified officials
who thought they were part of  an extremist group.40 Distrust of  reports from
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Chilean sources regarding military brutality was endemic among federal repre-
sentatives, who accepted the claims emanating from Ambassador Ross in
Santiago that the violence was being exaggerated by “radicals” and that the situa-
tion in Chile was returning to normal.41 It appears the embassy personnel even
ignored first-hand testimony by Canadians on the ground in Santiago – mostly
Québécois nuns and priests – of  finding bodies on banks of  Mapocho River,
which runs through the Chilean capital.42 Federal employees on both ends of
the continent seemed determined to view the 11 September takeover as little
more than another Latin American palace coup, despite a mounting pile of  evi-
dence that it was something altogether more violent and far-reaching.43
Chilean exchange students were not the only actors from the academic
world engaged in the asylum question. Local and national student and faculty
groups formed to advocate for the Chileans. At York University in Toronto,
approximately twenty students and teachers banded together to form the York
Committee for the Defense of  a Democratic and Independent Chile. The mem-
bers also called for Canada not to recognize the junta, to provide asylum, and to
raise and support censure motions in the United Nations.44 On the national
level, the World University Service Canada started the Canadian University
Committee for Refugee Chilean Professionals and Students, which worked with
the Association of  Universities and Colleges of  Canada and the National Union
of  Students to secure spots in Canadian post-secondary institutions for spon-
sored professors and students.45As an ongoing project, the sponsorship place-
ment effort had fairly modest results; however, as an act of  solidarity it served a
wider purpose, as “it sent a clear message to Chilean exiles and Canadian gov-
ernment officials that the Canadian intelligentsia was prepared and committed to
this politically contentious cause.”46 The Chilean solidarity question was attract-
ing participants across a broader front than traditional leftist parties and labour
unions.
To the disappointment of  the burgeoning Chile lobby, the federal gov-
ernment recognized the military regime on 29 September. The recognition issue
soured the 3 October meeting between CCC representatives and Minister Sharp.
The first of  three delegations sent by the CCC to Ottawa between October and
January 1974, the group encountered the same skepticism the Chilean student
group had faced two weeks earlier. Mitchell Sharp used press clippings from
Chile to claim that the situation was improving, claimed “these people don’t
want to come to Canada,” and cast doubt on the credibility of  the CCC
sources.47 With recognition of  the junta, one of  the pillars of  the solidarity
movement’s position had fallen, and the prospect of  humanitarian action seemed
dimmer now that the military regime in Chile had the Canadian government’s
tacit approval.
Despite this setback, the groups coalescing around the Chilean question
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remained undeterred, and began to see some results for their labours. On 7
October, sixteen of  the seventeen asylum seekers from the Santiago embassy
arrived in Montreal, having obtained special ministerial permits that would allow
them to stay in Canada for a year while their refugee claims were processed. In
addition, there is evidence that the External Affairs department was beginning to
take the issue more seriously, and on 10 October a high-ranking immigration
officer was tasked with going to Santiago to assess the situation and report back
on the potential need for a special movement programme for Chile.48 The com-
bination of  domestic pressure and the growing evidence of  the violence of  the
military regime was pushing Sharp and other government officials to take more
concrete actions. 
Recognition of  the military government occurred during Parliament’s
summer recess, from 22 September to 14 October. When the House of
Commons sat again on 15 October, Andrew Brewin immediately confronted
Minister Sharp on the issue of  recognition and the need to assist the persecuted
inside Chile. In remarks criticizing Ambassador Ross’ justification of  the coup,
the MP asked Sharp whether the government was willing to assist refugees by
granting asylum, safe conduct and travel assistance, as had been done in the past.
Sharp responded that the asylum seekers from the embassy had already safely
landed in Canada, that officials from Ottawa and Buenos Aires were going to
Santiago to assess the situation, and that if  further action were taken, it would be
in accordance with past actions: “I think the honourable gentleman can be sure
we shall act with humanity in these matters as we always do.”49
While Brewin continued to raise questions about the government’s
response to the refugee crisis throughout October, at the end of  the month
Chile-Canada Solidarity issued a call for individual Canadians to step forward to
sponsor Chileans as immigrants. The group promised help both in the process
of  matching Chileans to sponsors and with filling out the necessary paperwork
for the formal declaration required by immigration authorities, and outlined the
responsibilities of  sponsorship.50 As a tactic, it mirrored the actions of  the aca-
demic community and removed the need for Chileans to prove being in danger
to doubting embassy staff  and immigration officers in Santiago. The call also
mentioned the establishment of  a special immigration assistance fund being
planned in conjunction with, and under the administration of, the CCC. This
fund would materialize the following month as the Canadian Fund for Refugees
from Chile.51
By the end of  October 1973, the religious, labour, academic and other
diverse organisations across Canada involved in the Chilean solidarity movement
had developed a plan of  action, arguments and tactics, and established a degree
of  cooperation between different entities through umbrella groups such as
Chile-Canada Solidarity in Ontario. Although their call to withhold recognition
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of  the junta had gone unheeded, there were small signs that they were making
headway on the humanitarian issue of  refuge for the persecuted. Progress on
this front, however, was slow. Mitchell Sharp might claim in Parliament that
Canada would act from humanitarian impulses, but in reality suspicion about UP
adherents continued to inform the actions of  government officials, as the scan-
dal involving Ambassador Ross that surfaced in November 1973 would make
clear.
The Ross telegrams
On 5 November, NDP MP John Harney put forward a motion in the House of
Commons for the recall of  Andrew Ross, on the grounds that the ambassador
had betrayed “a bias that makes it impossible for him to carry out stated govern-
ment policy on political refugees in Chile.”52 The motion did not pass, but it
marked the beginning of  an episode that caused the government embarrassment
and provided the Chilean lobby with ammunition in its fight to open Canada’s
doors. The fallout from the publication of  leaked telegrams between
Ambassador Ross and the department of  External Affairs made government
representatives rethink Canada’s approach to the crisis in Chile, and in the end
contributed to the establishment of  a special programme to help Chileans in
peril.
Harney made his motion because of  what he had read in a series of
confidential communiqués which had passed between Santiago and Ottawa in
September, starting just before the coup and continuing until 29 September, the
day Canada announced it would recognize the junta. Harney in turn passed on a
number of  them to the LAWG, which promptly published them in a November
issue of  the Chile-Canada Solidarity Newsletter. While the “riff-raff  of  the Latin
American left” statement would become the most well-known, other statements
also pointed to Ambassador Ross welcoming the coup as a necessary evil, and
characterized the UP as responsible for its own demise for having allowed “left-
ist extremists [to have] almost free rein.”53 The fact that the top Canadian gov-
ernment representative in Chile seemed to support the coup caused Harney and
others to wonder whether the government was treating the refugee question as a
humanitarian issue, or whether Ross’ distaste for “leftist extremists” was leading
to government inaction. 
The revelations of  the telegrams led activists both in Canada and on
the ground in Chile to look more closely at how the embassy and the
Department of  Manpower and Immigration were dealing with asylum seekers
and refugee claimants, and their findings were not encouraging. On 7 November,
two Chilean churchmen and the foreign correspondent from Québec-Presse met
with Ambassador Ross to discuss the refugee issue and the role Canada could
play in it. Ross refused to consider granting asylum to a group of  one hundred
fugitives from the junta for whom the church officials were seeking shelter. Ross
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was also quoted as saying that Canada would accept Chileans who wanted to
immigrate and met the criteria but not asylum seekers, whom he would even
turn in to the authorities under certain circumstances.54 His comments indicated
that, despite claims to the contrary, Canadian officials were treating requests for
admission to Canada as an immigration issue rather than a humanitarian crisis.
The leaking of  the Ross telegrams put the federal government on the
defensive and led the cabinet to reexamine the way Ross, External Affairs and
Manpower and Immigration were dealing with refugee claimants. On 15
November, cabinet called for a complete review of  policy on Chile. According to
a solidarity movement source, this showed that senior government officials were
“upset by increasing evidence that what it hears from its ‘intelligence’ in Santiago
is not an accurate description of  the true situation in Chile.”55 Three fact-finding
teams were then dispatched, one to Santiago and the other two to Panama and
Honduras, where refugee claimants waiting for permission to enter third coun-
tries had congregated. The next day in the House of  Commons, John Harney
continued to press the issue. He motioned that “[T]his House instruct the gov-
ernment immediately to follow the measures adopted toward political refugees
from Hungary…Czechoslovakia…and Uganda, thereby respecting the traditions
which the Canadian people wish to have respected, and to instruct our embassies
and affected departments to act accordingly.”56 Harney insinuated that represen-
tatives of  the Canadian government were not obeying instructions nor acting
according to humanitarian principles. Though his motion failed, it highlighted
the contradictions between Canada’s stated policy and what was happening in
practice. 
The gap between humanitarian rhetoric and the reality on the ground
was further illustrated by a radio broadcast of  the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) programme As It Happens on 19 November. The correspon-
dent reporting from Santiago disclosed the presence of  two agents of  the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which among its many roles at the time was
the screening of  people applying for entry to Canada who might pose a threat to
national security.57 Commenting on the information, the Chile-Canada Solidarity
Newsletter accused the federal government of  putting political considerations
ahead of  compassion:
This news makes clearer the reason why the embassy filters in Santiago
had approved fewer than 10 applications for immigration to Canada in
the two months since the coup. If  Canadian official paranoia about
Communist and Socialists is applied to a situation where 40-50% of  the
population voted Communist or Socialist in the last few years, and
where precisely these people are “under the gun”, it becomes easy to
explain the lack of  response by Canadian officials: compassion blinded
by ideology inappropriate to the circumstances.58
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Details coming out of  Chile reinforced the accusation that the situation
was not being addressed adequately and that processing procedures and security
screening were particularly intensive due to ideological concerns. The embassy in
Santiago did not have enough translators or immigration operatives to deal with
the number of  applications, which sometimes reached over 1,000 a day.59 With
the NDP leading the way in Parliament and bodies like the CCC and the LAWG
lobbying tirelessly, pressure of  the federal government was mounting just as evi-
dence of  institutional bias and perhaps incompetence was building. The Chilean
lobby ensured that the issue was not going to disappear quietly and that the gov-
ernment would have to do more to alleviate the refugee situation.
The Special Movement Chile
On 29 November, Hortensia Bussi, the widow of  Salvador Allende, attended the
parliamentary session and had a brief  private meeting with Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau. Though her pleas to make Canada a haven for “Chileans who wish to
flee their country” only received a “non-committal nod,” she reported afterward
that Trudeau “promised an announcement today [30 November] of  plans for
bringing Chilean refugees to Canada.”60 The Prime Minister was as good as his
word, and on 30 November, Manpower and Immigration Minister Robert
Andras announced in the House the establishment of  an emergency refugee
admission programme called Special Movement Chile (SMC). After two and a
half  months of  constant pressure, the Chilean lobby had secured a major victo-
ry: Canadian action with regard to Chileans would now be part of  an official
programme that would operate under guidelines similar to those of  previous
crises in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Uganda.
In his speech, Andras began by praising the Canadian historical record
in accepting people seeking refuge and mentioned the precedents that govern-
ment critics had continuously used in arguing the Chileans’ case. Noting that
although “few people have expressed interest in immigrating to Canada” but
were rather looking for a haven, the minister announced that selection criteria
would be relaxed, meaning that individuals normally ineligible for immigration
under the points system in use at the time would not be excluded automatically,
although medical and security checks would continue.61 He promised accelerated
immigration processing, along with language training, job placement services,
and assistance to cover the costs of  transportation, accommodation, winter
clothing and “other such special support necessary to facilitate early establish-
ment.” Andras stated that special immigration teams were being dispatched to
Santiago, Buenos Aires, Panama and Honduras to begin processing applicants
under the Special Movement provisions and that the government expected
“some hundreds” would end up in the country. In the conclusion of  his state-
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ment, he called on the lobby groups who had forced the government to act to
now take the initiative:
In the past, individuals and groups have always rallied to provide local
support and assistance in welcoming displaced people to their new
communities and helping them to become established quickly. For these
efforts many thousands of  Canadians deserve special praise. In the case
of  Chile, large numbers of  Canadians in Church groups and other
organisations have expressed their genuine concern in the welfare of
those affected by the events in that country. We hope that again inter-
ested individuals and groups will join with the Government in the pro-
vision of  special assistance for these people by contacting their nearest
Canada Immigration Centre or Canada Manpower Centre. Many of  the
individuals now coming forward are young, well educated and adaptable
people who, with a little help, can be expected to add their contribution
to the richness and variety of  Canada.62
Reaction to the announcement of  the SMC in the House reflected a
number of  ideological positions present in the country. Jake Epp of  the
Progressive Conservatives voiced the Cold War concern about security, inquiring
about the nationalities of  the applicants and whether proper background checks
would continue. Gérard Laprise of  the right-wing Social Credit Party insisted
that the applicants continue to be treated as normal immigration applicants and
meet all requirements “to prevent Canada from becoming a refuge for all the
riff-raff  from all parts of  the world.” Speaking for the NDP, Andrew Brewin
accused the government of  not doing enough, an argument that would continue
to be made by the Chilean lobby in the years to come. Brewin commented that
the complacent nature of  the government response up to that point had only
been changed by the work of  “a large section of  the Canadian people. I refer
particularly to the people in Québec and people in the churches who communi-
cated with the government…indicating their deep concern about this matter.”
While acknowledging the need for background checks, Brewin stated that he
hoped they would be done quickly and not be influenced by ideology: 
I hope that a generous attitude will be taken and that political grounds
will not be advanced as a reason for keeping these refugees out of
Canada. It is all very well to call a person a Marxist and condemn him
for that reason, but we are dealing with people whose lives are in dan-
ger and I hope political judgments will not be used to keep people
out.63
The establishment of  the SMC marked an important moment in the
work of  the solidarity movement and showed that sustained efforts could bring
results. Using a combination of  arguments to precedent, appeals to the sense of
humanity of  Canadians at all levels, and at times outright shame tactics, the coali-
tion of  leftist and progressive groups achieved one of  their original goals. The
process to admit refugees would be normalized, simplified and, it was hoped,
divorced from the question of  ideology. The Chilean solidarity movement
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seemed to have forced a reluctant government to act and to have won a great
victory for activism over institutional suspicion and intransigence.
Beyond the SMC: the ongoing struggle between security and humanitari-
anism
If  I concluded this examination here, one might assume that the Chilean refugee
question was solved by the SMC, and that after 30 November 1973, frictions
between the federal government and the Chilean lobby ceased. To do so would
paint a false picture. Far from being the end of  the debate over admitting
Chileans, the SMC ultimately represented only a partial victory for the solidarity
lobby. The admission process became more transparent and codified, and
Chileans who gained admission to Canada received material support from feder-
al, provincial and municipal authorities, but there continued to be questions sur-
rounding the Canadian effort. Lobbying by the Chilean solidarity coalition con-
tinued into 1974 and beyond as evidence emerged that Canadian officials contin-
ued to treat refugee claimants like normal immigrants and were still obsessed
with weeding out people they considered terrorists. 
A Manpower and Immigration memorandum from early 1974 is explicit
in the perceived dangers Chileans posed to Canada. The author took issue with
the argument that the Chilean issue was comparable to that of  the Hungarians in
1956, the Czechoslovakians in 1968 or the Ugandans in 1972. He added “In the
Chilean situation, security information is fairly readily available, and there are
known to be extremists among the people seeking to leave Chile. We would actu-
ally be derelict in our responsibilities if  we did not observe normal screening
procedures.” He emphasised the point that the 1951 United Nations Convention
on Refugees does not preclude screening, and even allows for the expulsion of
refugees if  there are reasonable grounds for considering them a threat to the
security of  the receiving state. Given this fact, the author stated “It would seem
to follow logically that refugees should, therefore, be subject to normal security
screening procedures prior to their admission.” With regard to the danger posed
to Canada by Chilean leftists, he wrote
Professional or dedicated revolutionaries…are apt to regard the country
which grants them asylum simply as a base from which they can contin-
ue their attempts to redress real or imagined wrongs. There is ample
evidence in the world today that such people may even consider “aerial
hijackings”, bombings and assassinations as justifiable means of  attain-
ing their ends. Aside from the embarrassment such activities may cause
the government, security screening of  refugees, whether from the left
or from the right, is an important and effective means of  ensuring that
our traditional hospitality toward all refugees is not undermined by
granting undue consideration to this element. 64
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With this kind of  attitude still present in immigration circles, the soli-
darity groups had to maintain their level of  engagement. The United Church of
Canada, an active CCC participant, published newsletters that decried the lethar-
gic rate at which Manpower and Immigration processed claimants, and the small
numbers of  applicants accepted.65 Church delegations continued to meet with
Ministers Andras and Sharp to make sure the federal government did not reduce
its presence in Chile, which Andras had announced would happen in February
1974, claiming that all the “most urgent cases have been dealt with and
the…need for special efforts is passed.”66 Groups such as LAWG publicized
information about the Chilean situation, while solidarity groups across the coun-
try organized speaking tours by former UP members and Chilean refugees, con-
certs and peñas (traditional Chilean parties) to raise money for political prisoners
in Chile and awareness among the Canadian public.67 While individual solidarity
groups ran their own events and focused on a particular aspect of  the solidarity
campaign, at certain moments the diverse entities would ban together to petition
the government.68 Joint action was particularly notable in October 1974 and
March 1976, when solidarity movement representatives from a wide range of
bodies presented collective reports to the federal government dealing with ques-
tions of  human rights, financial relations and immigration. In both reports, the
solidarity lobby appealed to the Canadian government to do more to help
Chileans in danger and to relax admission criteria for refugee claimants. Even
three years into the crisis, ideological concerns continued to restrict the number
of  Chileans accepted: “We are concerned, as we have stated in the past, that
because of  traditional security criteria, Canada has rejected or participated in the
rejection of  such a large proportion of  applicants for refugee resettlement in
Canada. We are dealing with refugees and not normal immigrants.”69 The SMC
may have set the stage for the admission of  larger numbers of  Chileans, but it
was only a temporary victory. Until the SMC ended in 1978, members of  the
solidarity movement had to keep the Chilean issue in the public eye to ensure
that the government continued working on the problem in a manner that was
consistent with the humanitarian approach it espoused.70
However, focusing only on the reluctance of  Canadian officials would
unfairly paint the government’s eventual accomplishments in resettling Chileans.
While government ministers were at first unwilling to set a quota for the number
of  Chileans who would be admitted, it was eventually set at 7,000, which com-
pared very favourably with other nations sheltering exiles.71 The number of
Chileans in Canada passed 10,000 by 1980, whereas there had been only 555
before 1971.72 A late 1976 Manpower and Immigration report gives us some
idea of  the rate of  acceptance of  applicants to the SMC to that point, where
they ended up in Canada and what their occupations were. From September
1973 to the end of  February, 1976, 5,620 Chileans had applied for entry to
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Canada as refugees or as members of  an Oppressed Minority (OM), a special
term used to cover persecuted individuals not eligible for refugee designation
under the 1951 UN Convention definition of  a refugee.73 Of  this number, 4,420
had already been authorized to enter, 3,501 had landed, 970 were still in process,
100 political prisoners had been accepted, and 7,390 applicants had been refused
or withdrawn their requests. Refusal for 590 cases included these general reasons:
civil or settlement issues, 100; security reasons, 470; and health reasons, 20 cases.
Of  3,097 landed Chileans, 12 were in Atlantic Canada, 695 in Québec, 920 in
Ontario,   1,328 were in the three Prairie provinces (most of  these in Alberta),
and 142 Chileans had settled in British Columbia. Occupational information is
very general, but breaks down in the following way: Skilled/professional, 645;
semi-skilled, 398; unskilled, 207; and non-workers (dependents), 1,847.74 Though
it is likely many Chileans who would have liked to take shelter in Canada did not
get in because of  the bias against their entry in certain government circles, effec-
tive lobbying by concerned groups did eventually ensure that a substantial group
of  mostly young, often highly educated and skilled Chileans did escape the
repression in their homeland and find a space in which to recover from the trau-
ma of  their lives being turned upside down.
The Chilean solidarity movement in perspective
Despite the conflict among sectors of  the government and the solidarity move-
ment caused by the Chilean issue, the problem was not one that excited a large-
scale reaction in Canadian society. Chileans did not arrive in massive enough
numbers between 1973 and 1978 to significantly change the demographic profile
of  the nation, and their contributions to Canadian society generally became
apparent later, after several years in the country. The arrival of  Chilean refugees
did not suddenly cause most Canadians to look more closely and deeply at Latin
America, nor examine their own country’s position in the Cold War world and
how it affected policy questions like refugee admission. The sudden growth of
the Chilean community was not, in and of  itself, a momentous event.
So why bother examining this subject at all? The answer to that lies in
the changes to Canadian refugee and immigration law provoked by the Chilean
presence, and in the development of  an effective domestic pro-refugee and
human rights lobby that coalesced around the issue. Though their contribution
to these developments was inadvertent, the mere fact of  them being in Canada
or their desire to come here made the admission of  Chileans significant. 
The post-coup crisis in Chile contributed to the growth of  a coalition
of  allied organisations in Canada that was active in a wide range of  issues
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, from denouncing military regimes in Latin
America to protesting the apartheid regime in South Africa. This lobby, with the
political left and church activists at its core, exerted enough pressure to achieve
policy change at the federal level. Joan Simalchik, whose academic work has been
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cited in this study, co-founded the Toronto Action for Chile and served as the
head of  Canadian Committee for Solidarity with Democratic Chile from 1977 to
1983. In her writing on the Chilean refugee issue, she asserts that the ultimate
effect of  political actions on behalf  of  the first wave of  Chileans was the cre-
ation of  a distinct refugee category in the reformed 1976 Immigration Act,
which went into effect in 1978. Lobbying over the Chilean issue had helped
ensure that in refugee questions humanitarian considerations would be given pri-
ority over economic or political factors.75 This helped contribute more to
Canada’s international image as an open, humane country that would give a
home to the persecuted, which culminated in the entire nation receiving the hon-
our of  the Nansen Refugee Award from the United Nations in 1986. Aside from
the international laurels, the reforms spurred by the arrival of  the Chileans
helped other refugees, such as the Vietnamese, and strengthened Canadian civil
society:
The thousands of  Canadians involved with the “boat people”, coupled
with the coalitions created during the Chilean lobby, created a new pro-
refugee constituency in the larger civic culture. A developing refugee
support network took shape. With roots in the mid-1970s work for
Chilean refugees, community-based and professional agencies were cre-
ated to assist in long term settlement needs (for example, education,
language and skills training), specialized medical care, especially treat-
ment for torture victims, sponsorship cases, refugee law and policy
development.76
At the end of  the day, Chileans coming to Canada may not have fundamentally
altered the country, but the efforts made by solidarity activists to push for their
admission provided the impetus for changes that have benefitted hundreds of
thousands of  persecuted people since. Though the impact was brought about by
unhappy circumstance, the work of  the Chilean solidarity movement left a signif-
icant mark on Canadian society.
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